Showing posts with label brokerage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label brokerage. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

Removing All Mystery From Modern Wealth Management Performance

Stock brokerage was a middle class career path in America after World War II, thanks to brokerages that hired military veterans to staff branch offices across the country. The sector morphed into financial advisory and became a playground for the spoiled kids of rich families. It happened gradually, then suddenly, much like the way spendthrift households go bankrupt.

Legions of stock brokers built their books of business with long hours of cold-calling complete strangers. Federal legislation behind the National Do Not Call Registry removed millions of potential wealth management prospects from the financial sector's reach. The USA PATRIOT ACT further required financial institutions to thoroughly know their potential customers, in the expectation that familiarity kept terrorists out of finance. Brokerages in the early 2000s knew these legal changes would quickly make mass cold-calling an obsolete way to attract new business. They needed some new juice.

Demographics answered the brokerages' growth dilemma. Some market researchers figured out in the 1990s that wealthy people increasingly preferred doing business with other people who were just like them. Being rich was the surest sign of trustworthiness. Everybody was getting rich in the 1990s from the dot-com bubble, so it all seemed so easy without any work ethic or basic financial competence.

Leading brokerages hired consulting firms after the 2001 dot-com crash to redesign their new broker employment pipelines, compensation plans, and even their branding and cultures. The result was a collection of top-tier brokerage firms that defined success as walking in the door with enough money to instantly produce high six-figure revenue. Most firms would put this figure at a minimum $10M book of business. The only people who could pull this off were the trust fund kids born into serious wealth. Mom and dad hand over the family fortune to Junior, who takes a wealth management job to fulfill some stipulation in their multigenerational trust fund. Meanwhile, the brokerage's branch manager acts in loco parentis to ensure Junior sticks around during market hours. It all makes being rich look so easy, and that's enough to fool newly rich clients.

It's easy to become a top-performing wealth manager today. Just walk in the door with your family's $10M and do absolutely nothing. Anyone else hired in a wealth management branch who walks in with less money will be fired in a few months, because their expected production after half a year will curve up by the amount of revenue they would have made if they had walked in with $10M. In other words, wealth management firms employ the hard-working poor to generate qualified leads that their rich peers will collect after they are fired.

I have no empirical research to support my observations above. Chalk it all up to what I have personally witnessed since earning my MBA. Investors have every right to know what their hired financial professionals do with client money. In almost all cases, the hired pros do somewhere between nothing and less than nothing.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

The Haiku of Finance for 01/24/15

Automate advice
Cut out brokers from clients
Obsolete selling

Saturday, November 16, 2013

Friday, April 26, 2013

The Hidden Agenda Behind Retail Investment Proprietary Products

I despise proprietary investment products.  These are investment securities specific to one brokerage, usually created by its investment bank or wholesale asset management arm.  They've been around for years and need to go away.  Like mutual funds, they've outlived whatever usefulness they possessed at their creation.

Internal hedge funds are stupid and probably a conflict of interest.  The academic research on the inability of actively managed funds to deliver alpha over the long term is clear.  The high expenses and volatility of hedge funds magnify this deficiency.  Firms that create internal hedge funds use them as dumping grounds for securities they couldn't sell to retail investors and as make-work jobs for well-connected insiders who have nothing better to do for a few years.

Structured notes and principal-protected notes are just as dumb.  They represent positions on a given sector or theme that knowledgeable investors can execute themselves with option strategies.  Credit spreads and collars on ETFs are a whole lot cheaper than some note underwritten by an investment bank.

Proprietary products IMHO accomplish two functions very much in the interest of brokerages.  They tie a client's assets to one firm and tie a broker's book of business to one firm.  Think about it.  A client who is dissatisfied with a broker and wants to move assets elsewhere won't normally be able to transfer the brokerage's proprietary products.  They must be liquidated, incurring a capital gain, if the client wants to move all of their assets.  This sets up the client for a very discouraging conversation with their existing wealth manager:  "Oh gee, you can't move all those structured notes I sold you because the gains will mess up your asset allocation.  You can't move your hedge funds either because you're locked in for five years."

A broker who wants to jump to another firm will face similar hurdles if she or he sold a bunch of proprietary stuff to a significant number of clients.  The top-producing big shot who just had their gross payout reduced will have to think hard after realizing that proprietary products aren't portable from one firm to another.  They are a crude form of "sticky" money that stays with a firm regardless of a broker's customer service skills.

Smart investors ignore sales pitches for the in-house favorite funds and notes.  They cost a premium, which firms and salespeople like to collect, but add little to a well-diversified portfolio (i.e., large and small caps, laddered fixed income, hard assets, etc.).

Smart brokers ignore the internal bonuses paid for sales of proprietary products.  They keep their books of business portable by focusing on widely held fund families and individual securities that any brokerage can hold.

I used to be stupid about proprietary products but I eventually got smart.  I have not owned proprietary products since 2006.  I tried to sell them to prospects when I was a financial advisor in 2005-2006; no one bought them from me.  One prospect even ran away screaming when I described how a principal-protected note worked.  I learned about structured notes' stickiness the hard way when I moved my assets from the full-service firm that fired me to a discount brokerage.  The structured notes wouldn't move until I sold them.  They netted out to just about zero gain after transaction costs.  I will never invest in proprietary products again.

Friday, April 06, 2012

People Lie About Wanting Financial Advice From Ex-Military

I don't enjoy being angry.  I read something today that made me boiling mad.  Some survey claims that Americans value military veterans as financial advisers, and that this estimation increases with a respondent's affluence.  I need to state for the record that nothing could be further from the truth.

I spent over a year as a financial advisor at a major wealth management firm.  I worked harder than I ever have in my life to acquire clients.  Every prospect I encountered - with two exceptions - completely ignored my military experience as a selling point for my abilities.  The two exceptions were unique; one had very little liquid net worth to invest and the other was a phony who had zero net worth.  All of the other prospects regarded my military background as something to disregard.

People with serious money to invest want it managed by someone who's achieved a comparable level of success.  I find it telling that the Edward Jones survey above mentioned households with incomes of $100K or so.  I hate to break this to the 1300 ex-military advisors they employ, but their careers will be short if they focus on acquiring people at that income level.  Wealth management firms are increasingly discarding advisors who pursue clients with net worth under $1M.  Making $100K/year isn't going to get anyone to millionaire status in an America beset by price inflation, equity overvaluation, creeping hyperinflation, and a rapacious elite bent on regulatory capture and financial repression.

I employed all of my military-acquired skills to establish trust, build rapport, demonstrate an extreme work ethic, prove my integrity, and persevere in the face of adversity.  All of those traits turned off people with serious money.  All of those attributes got me terminated.  Most veterans hired as financial advisors don't realize that they're just filling an affirmative action quota and will be gone in a year.  That's why brokerages can afford to brag that some percent of their sales force is comprised of veterans.  They know that annual turnover for lack of production enables them to keep hiring and firing unsuspecting veterans over and over again.  Americans who say they want military veterans as financial advisors probably don't make enough money to afford an advisor in the first place.  Too many people just don't know what they're talking about.  

Saturday, March 24, 2012

Morgan Stanley Salivates Over Smith Barney

Another brand name brokerage may be headed for complete absorption by a long-time rival, in this case Smith Barney.  Morgan Stanley is reportedly hungry to devour the chunk of Smith Barney it doesn't already own.  That would be the final unraveling of the house that Citi built during the late 1990s in its bid to become the first true global financial supermarket.  Its acquisitions of Smith Barney and the Travelers insurance group proved to be so unwise that it has unwound much of what it bought since then just to raise enough capital to survive.

I recall doing a case study of Citi in 2002 for my MBA class in M+A.  I was the lone voice in the class arguing that Citi's mergers would prove to be a strategic disaster and I was able to sway my teammates to agree with me.  Another team gave a competing presentation arguing Citi's mergers would work out great, relying exclusively on DCF projections and other quantitative estimates without any qualitative assessments of strategic fit.  Ah, memories.  It goes to show that academic rote only gets you so far.  Truly insightful analysis often requires an intuitive leap.

Citigroup would be wise to sell its stake now before the renewed recession hits retail investors' portfolios and Smith Barney's revenue.  Oh, BTW, none of these firms ever seriously wanted to hire me so I wouldn't be terribly bothered if they all suffer.

Full disclosure:  No positions in MS or C at this time.


Friday, March 09, 2012

MF Global Ripped Off Big Players Too

Individual clients of bankrupt commodities brokerage MF Global can take some cold comfort in the news that big corporations also got their pockets picked.  Major corporations that used futures to hedge commodity prices through MF Global comprised a fifth of the client funds that "vaporized."  The good news is that these players have the deep pockets for class action lawsuits and the political pull to ensure regulators don't sweep this under the rug.

I actually once considered opening a futures account with Refco, MF Global's predecessor firm, years before it collapsed.  I decided against it mainly because I'm not some heavy commodity user who really needs a hedge.  There are plenty of ETFs in oil, metals, and agriculture to satisfy the diversification needs of most normal investors.

Trust is in short supply.  Even big companies can't trust their brokerages anymore.  I hope these Fortune 500 victims get together and strategize some lawfare that will bury the MF Global malefactors in a big pile of . . . well, you can insert a fanciful agricultural commodity here.  

Monday, February 27, 2012

Money Market Fund "New Rules"

Comedian Bill Maher popularized the catch phrase "new rule" to describe some cultural truism that cries out for instant change.  Maybe financial regulators are trying out some material from his script.  The SEC is thinking out loud about some new rules for money market funds.  You may remember those funds from 2008 when the inability of the Primary Reserve Fund to maintain its NAV north of one dollar almost brought commercial activity in North America to a halt.

The only proposed rule that makes sense to me is to make the share price a floating value.  Such a fund isn't cash if it's invested in securities that have some kind of maturity, even an overnight maturity.  Money market funds belong in the general category of actively managed fixed income funds but brokerages are reluctant to break this bad news to clients.  It will mean one less cash management tool in a toolbox already bereft of yield thanks to the Fed's zero interest rate policy.  Wealth management firms had better quickly find some other place to sweep overnight balances if they want to avoid an MF Global kind of collapse in the next surprise credit crunch.

I'm more than willing to use Bill Mahr's method here.  "New rule: A money market fund is no such thing if it doesn't hold money (as cash) and can't be exchanged on a market (due to illiquidity)."  That wording should be easy enough for the SEC to implement.

Full disclosure:  No position in any money market funds at this time.

Friday, March 25, 2011

Schwab Buys optionsXpress In Bid For Discount Investors

Sometimes it pays to pay even when you're used to chasing discounts.  Charles Schwab, one of America's leading discount brokerages, is offering $1B in stock for optionsXpress.  Thumbnail sketches are in order. 

This is an all-stock deal, with 60mm new SCHW shares going to OXPS holders.  SCHW shareholders will experience dilution of about 5%, which isn't bad considering they're getting a huge options brokerage's market position.  OXPS's ROE of 25% is unbelievably healthy, although its three straight years of declining net income is a cause for concern.  OXPS's accounts payable and long-term debt are manageable loads for SCHW's balance sheet to bear. 

Writing puts under OXPS would be tempting if this were a cash deal, but the all-stock characteristic would make such a move very vulnerable to market volatility.  That is a huge risk to take with OXPS's P/E over 20 and SCHW's over 47. 

Schwab is probably making the right long-term move here, but the risk factors above take the joy out of any short-term special situation strategy for investors. 

Full disclosure:  No position in SCHW or OXPS. 

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Schwab Settlement Done But Problems Remain

Schwab settled some major litigation with securities regulators today.  The agreement will cost the firm $118.9mm thanks to loads of high-risk securities stuffed into a bond fund marketed as a low-risk product.  The credibility from "Uncle Charlie's" own money in the fund wasn't enough to avoid harm to the firm bearing his name.

The stock market obviously didn't think much of the penalty as SCHW was off only four cents today.  The stock is trading pretty close to its 52-week high and analyst sentiment is fairly bullish, so plenty of people think the worst is past.  The remaining question is whether such optimism is warranted by the fundamentals. 

The P/E ratio is over 42, an astoundingly high multiple for a mature firm in a heavily regulated industry.  A quick glance at three years' worth of income statements shows a progressive collapse in both gross revenue and net income.  The quarterly income statements for 2010 show that the decline in gross revenue has not been halted.  SCHW will need blowout results for Q4 2010 to justify the confidence of all those mainstream analysts. 

Schwab still benefits from a strong brand and leading market position among discount brokers.  Schwab's best days may very well be ahead, but its worst days may not be completely behind it yet. 

Full disclosure:  No position in SCHW.